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Recent years have seen several consolidations and restructurings in the
United States coal market. Every indication is that this trend of consolidation and
restructuring will continue and that the antitrust enforcement and regulatory
agencies (the "Agencies"), the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Department of Justice-Antitrust Division ("DOJ"), will, therefore, continue to be
called upon to review mergers and acquisitions in the United States coal industry.
This Article outlines the Agencies' historical analyses of the coal industry,
and discusses some subsequent changes in the market and market forces which,
the article concludes, warrant a more relaxed scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions
in the coal industry.' The first section of this Article discusses how the Agencies
analyze mergers generally under the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The second section
then describes how the Agencies are likely to apply the general merger analysis
to coal mergers with particular emphasis on the Agencies' approach in light of the
extensive coal industry analysis undertaken by the DOJ in the early 1980s.
Finally, the Article describes the dramatic changes that have occurred in coal
production, transportation and use since the DOJ's industry-wide analysis, and
explains how the Agencies should modify their analysis of subsequent transactions
in the coal industry to take account of these new realities.
I. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MERGERS
The primary purpose of antitrust scrutiny of mergers is to prevent a
proposed merger from resulting in the creation or exercise of "market power" by
a single firm, or a group of firms acting collusively. Market power is defined as

The FTC has already taken a significant step in this direction. On March 25, 1996, the FTC
announced that it had amended its Hart-Scott-Rodino ("H-S-R") regulations to exempt "acquisitions
of coal reserves and certain associated productions and exploration assets valued at $200 million or
less" because "experience has taught us that certain categories of acquisitions do not rcompetitive concerns." See FTCEnacts New Exemptions from MergerRegulations, Plan Will El.
Regulatory Burden on Business, FTC NEws, Mar. 25, 1996. While the FTC action merely raisethe threshold size of coal transactions subject to H-S-R's prior notification requirements, this article
advocates a substantive change in the analysis of coal mergers.
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the ability to maintain prices profitably above competitive levels, or to exclude
competitors or to reduce output for a significant period of time.2 The primary
federal antitrust statute governing mergers is section 7 of the Clayton Act ("the
Act").' The legislative history of the Act evinces a strong congressional intent
to prevent, in their "incipiency," mergers that could create or enhance market
power.' In interpreting and applying the Act, the federal courts have developed
a significant body of case law analyzing mergers.' Largely, that case law relies
on the size of the merging parties' market shares in the relevant market to make
inferences concerning post merger market power.6
Not completely satisfied by the analytical constructs developed by the
courts, the Agencies developed, then subsequently revised, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines to guide their analysis of proposed mergers. The current version of
the Merger Guidelines was adopted in 1992 (the "Merger Guidelines").7
Although the Merger Guidelines self consciously incorporate the basic approach
adopted by the federal courts to analyze mergers, they also add significant
economic precision and structure to the methodology. The Merger Guidelines
generally prescribe a four-step process for identifying and analyzing any
competitive risks raised by a proposed merger: (1) definition of the relevant
product and geographic market, (2) identification of the participants in those
markets, (3) calculation of market concentration, and (4) balancing of competitive
effects.
A.

Definition of Relevant Markets
The first step in the Merger Guidelines analysis is to identify the relevant

2

Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,553 (1992) (section 0.1) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].

3 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
4 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-23 (1962).

5 See HorizontalMergers: Law and Policy, Monograph 12, ABA Antitrust Section, 1986.
See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315-23. Over time, the courts have become increasingly more
sophisticated in this process by integrating such factors as buyer power, barriers to entry and
changing market realities into their analysis. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974) (rebutting market power presumption by depleting reserves); FTC v. Elders Grain,
Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989) (rebutting market power presumption by evidence of
sophisticated buyers); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984)
(rebutting market power presumption by evidence of entry).
6

7 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3.
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product and geographic markets in which the merging firms compete.'
to the Merger Guidelines, a relevant market is defined as:
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According

a product or group of products and a geographic area in which
it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing
firm, not subject to price regulations, that was the only present
and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely
would impose at least a "small but significant and nontransitory"
increase in price, assuming the terms of the sale of all other
products are held constant.9
When defining a relevant product market under the Merger Guidelines,
the analyst initially selects a particular product from one of the merging firms,
and asks whether a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to increase
the product's price above the current level by five percent or more. If the answer
is yes, that product is deemed a relevant market for further consideration, and the
analyst moves on to the next product.'0 If the answer is no, that particular
product alone is deemed too narrow to constitute a relevant market. The analyst
repeats the process using a broader set of products that includes the next best set
of substitutes." Then, the analyst inquires whether a sole provider of both the
product and the next best set of substitutes could profitably increase the price by
five percent. If yes, a relevant market contains that set of products.' If no, the
analyst adds the next best set of substitutes and repeats the process. 3 A relevant
product market consists of the smallest set of products for which a hypothetical
monopolist would find it profitable to increase prices by five percent. 4 The
analyst delineates markets for all of the products from each merging firm. Next
one must compare the two sets of product markets to determine whether the
merging firms are participants in any of the same product markets. If the product

8 Id. at 41,554-55 (section 1.1 1).
9 Id. at 41,554 (section 1.0).
0 Id. at 41,554-55 (section 1. 11).

11 d.
12

Merger Guidelines, supra note 2 at 41,554-55 (section 1.11).

13 Id.
14

Id.
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markets overlap, the merger is deemed "horizontal" and analysis of any potential
anticompetitive effects resulting from the merger continues.
The Merger Guidelines define geographic markets in an analogous
manner. 5 Beginning with the location of each merging firm, the analyst asks
whether a sole provider of the relevant product in that location could raise its
price by five percent. 6 If the answer is no, the geographic area must be
expanded to include the next best substitute for production and repeats the
analysis. 7 This process continues until the test is satisfied. For any given
merger, there can be multiple relevant product and geographic markets, each
addressing a different possible exercise of market power.
In markets in which price discrimination occurs, i.e., where identical
products are sold at different prices to different customers, each customer or
group of customers that receives a distinct price may constitute a separate relevant
market. 8 This is very important for delineation of coal markets because most
westem coal (approximately ninety percent) is sold to electric utilities. 9 Since
the process by which coal is sold to large utilities frequently takes the form of
competitive bidding for individual contracts, and since there is often considerable
variation in individual contracts and market conditions, the resulting individual
pricing is like price discrimination. As a result, geographic markets for the sale
of coal can be as small as the coal mines capable of serving a single large utility.
Identification of Market Participants

B.

After defining the relevant markets, the next step is to identify the
participants in those markets. According to the Merger Guidelines, the
participants in the relevant market are those finns that currently produce in the
relevant market and those firms that could produce in the relevant market within
one year without incurring substantial sunk costs.20 Thus, the Merger Guidelines
require that the Agencies take account of the possibility of new entry in the

15 Id. at 41555-56 (section 1.21).
16 Id.

"7 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2 at 41555-56 (section 1.21).
's

Id.

'9

See Mark Sievers, An Economic Analysis of Utility-Coal Company Relationships, 8 J. ENERGY

L. & POL'Y 27, 29 (1987).
20 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, at 41,556-57 (section 1.3).
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relevant market after the merger before drawing any conclusions about likely
post-merger market concentration. Entry that is sufficiently likely, timely and
substantial in magnitude can overcome the presumption of increased market
power that arises when a proposed merger would otherwise result in increased
market concentration. 2'
C.

Calculation of Market Concentration

After identifying the firms that participate in the relevant markets, each
firm's market share is calculated. Market share figures are used to calculate the
Herfindal-Hirschman index of market concentration ("HHI's") for the post-merger
markets and the change in concentration resulting from the merger. 22 The Merger
Guidelines consider post-merger HHI's of 1800 or higher to represent highly
concentrated markets.23 Mergers that increase the HHI by more than 100 points
are rebuttably presumed to create market power.24
D.

Competitive Effects Analysis

Transactions that exceed the acceptable HHI standards are not necessarily
determined to be anticompetitive, however. The Agencies merely use the HHI
standards as thresholds to identify mergers with sufficient anticompetitive
potential to warrant more particularized scrutiny. Even for mergers with high
HUI's, the Agencies must develop a credible scenario under which the particular
merger would cause market power to increase before a proposed merger will be
challenged. The "competitive effects" section of the Merger Guidelines provides
a framework for developing such a competitive analysis.
In this process,
efficiencies that will accrue specifically from the merger must be taken account
of to determine whether they are sizeable enough to outweigh any competitive

2

Id. at 41,561 (section 3.0).

The formula for calculating the HHI is the sum of the squared market shares. Id. at 41,558
(section 1.51). For example, if a market consists of five firms, each with a 20% market share, then
the HHI is 202 + 202 + 202 + 202 + 202, or 2000.
22

23

Id.

24 Id.

25

Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at 41,558 (section 2.0).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss3/4

6

Glick et al.: Mergers in Western Coal Markets: Conforming Antitrust Analysis to
1997]

MERGERS IN WESTERN COAL MARKETS

danger from the merger.26
II. AGENCY ANALYSIS OF COAL MERGERS
In addition to the Merger Guidelines themselves, one other source of
information gives important insight into how the Agencies are likely to analyze
any particular proposed merger in the coal industry. Between 1979 and 1983,
pursuant to a congressional mandate imposed by section 8 of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976,27 DOJ published a series of reports entitled
Competition in the Coal Industry (the "Competition Reports") setting forth a
detailed competitive analysis of the United States coal market.28
Though somewhat dated, these Competition Reports continue to play a
significant role in the Agencies' review of proposed coal mergers under the
Merger Guidelines for two reasons. First, the Competition Reports, in many
respects, represent the latest in-depth study of the United States coal industry.
Second, the Competition Reports share common authors and prescribe a similar
analytical process as the later adopted Merger Guidelines. Accordingly, they
provide likely starting places for Agency analysis.29
A.

Definition of Relevant Markets

In the early Competition Reports, the DOJ concluded that the relevant
product market for coal is comprised of all varieties of bituminous and lignite
coals (notwithstanding variations in sulfur, BTU or ash contents), but excludes
anthracite coals.3" Importantly, the Competition Reports also concluded that
26

Id. at 41,562 (section 4).

2' 30 U.S.C. § 208-2 (1994) (repealed 1995).
2 The "Competition in the Coal Industry" reports contain extensive in-depth analysis. Each report
addresses one or more issues relevant to competitive analysis; e.g., the appropriate product and
geographic market definition, the proper measurement of concentration, transportation issues,
alternative fuel substitutability, entry and expansion, likelihood of collusion, etc. Taken together,
these reports provide a comprehensive (but dated) evaluation of competitiveness in the coal industry.
29 In a recent article, Gregory Werden of the DOJ endorsed the DOJ's earlier model of coal
geographic markets. See Identifying Market Power in Electric Generation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb.
15, 1996, at 16, 19.
30 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETrrION INTHE COAL INDUSTRY, May 1978, at 39 [hereinafter 1978
COMPETITION REPORT]. Coal is typically classified into four types based on carbon content and heat
generated: lignite, subbituminous, bituminous and anthracite. At one end of the spectrum is lignite
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alternative energy sources were not properly included in the same product market
as coal. 31 The DOJ specifically analyzed interfuel substitutability between both
coal and nuclear fuel and coal and oil, but did not discuss at length the
substitution possibilities between coal and natural gas.32 In sum, the DOJ's
position, at least at the time of the 1978 and 1979 Competition Reports, was that
substitution between coal and oil, natural gas, nuclear, and bulk power was
sufficiently attenuated to preclude delineation of a product market broader than
coal. 33 This conclusion dramatically affects the scope of the market and the
likelihood of finding any potentially adverse competitive effects from any
particular proposed merger. The DOJ has not issued any subsequent statements
retracting or even drawing into question these earlier conclusions.
The DOJ Competition Reports also devote extensive analysis to defining
geographic markets in the coal industry. In its first Competition Report to
Congress in 1978, the DOJ defined two relevant western geographic markets for
coal - the "Northern Plains" (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and
Wyoming) and the "Southwest" (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah). 34
The DOJ's conclusions in these early reports are consistent with several economic
studies in the late 1970s that also defined rather narrow relevant geographic
markets for coal.35
In 1982, the DOJ revisited its geographic market analysis, citing two
important changes in the economic environment. First, the DOJ identified a rapid

which generates the least heat and has the smallest carbon content. At the other end of the spectrum
is anthracite which is a harder coal with a high heat content. Just below lignite is subbituminous
coal. Finally, bituminous coal, which falls between subbituminous coal and anthracite, comprises
the bulk of domestic coal production.
31

Id.

32

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, May 1979, at 12-15 [hereinafter

1979 COMPETITION
33

REPORT].

1978 COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 30, at 28-38.

id.

3' The report also defined Appalachia and the Midwest as separate markets. See 1978 COMPETITION
REPORT, supra note 30, at 49-50. The same report also considered the possibility of additional
smaller markets. Id. at 43-44 n.92.
35 See, e.g., Ronald E. Shrieves, GeographicMarket Area and Market Structure in the Bituminous
Coal Industry, 23 ANTrrRuSTBULL. 589, 602 (1978) (defining markets smaller than the Northern

Plains and the Southwest); Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas G. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic
Market DelineationRevisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL., 1, 12 (1978) (also defining
markets smaller than the Northern Plains and the Southwest).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss3/4

8

Glick et al.: Mergers in Western Coal Markets: Conforming Antitrust Analysis to
MERGERS IN WESTERN COAL MARKETS

1997]

escalation in rail rates for coal transportation between 1977 and 1982, thereby
significantly restricting the geographic area to which a coal consumer could
reasonably turn for a supply of coal.36 Second, the DOJ acknowledged that
tighter regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
for sulfur dioxide emissions from coal burning utility plants had placed a
premium on so-called low sulfur coals.37 As a result of these changes, the 1982
Competition Report concluded that the Powder River Basin had become a
separate relevant geographic market distinct from the Northern Plains.38
In identifying the relevant geographic markets in its 1982 Competition
Report, the DOJ employed analytical methods consistent with those later
prescribed in the Merger Guidelines. The DOJ used the Coal and Electric
Utilities Model ("CEUM") constructed by ICF, Inc.39 Similar to the test adopted
in the Merger Guidelines, the model purported to simulate the impact of a
hypothetical price increase on the profits of the aggregate of firms in various coal
producing regions.4"
The CEUM model found that there were three relevant geographic
markets in the West: (1) the Powder River Basin market, consisting of the very
low sulfur/low BTU coal producing region of northeastern Wyoming and
southeastern Montana; (2) the Southwest market, including a variety of coal
producing regions located in Colorado, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico and the nonPowder River Basin region of Wyoming; and (3) the Northern Plains market,
consisting of the primarily lignite coal areas in northeastern Wyoming, Montana,
and the Dakotas.4
1.

Powder River Basin

The 1982 Competition Report found that "[t]he Powder River Region is
the most important coal-producing region in the West, accounting for

6 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, Dec. 1982, at 16-18 [hereinafter

1982 COMPETITION REPORT].
37 Id.

3'Id. at 36.
39 Id. at 24. ICF, Inc. is an independent economic consulting firm.
40 Id.at 33.
41 1982 COMPETITION REPORT,

supra note 36, at 35.
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approximately two-thirds of western coal reserves. ' However, the Report also
recognized that "the great bulk [of this Powder River Basin coal] is shipped over
a wide area of the West and especially the Midwest, with very large quantities
going to Texas and significant quantities crossing the Mississippi River."43
Because of this, the Competition Report concluded, "Powder River coal competes
to varying degrees against most other deposits in the West as well as those in the
Midwest and Texas. 44
The conclusion that the Powder River Region constituted a separate
geographic market resulted primarily from the DOJ's perception that Powder
River Basin coal possessed unique qualities and uses. In particular, DOJ found
that EPA regulations governing sulfur dioxide emissions played a decisive role
in many large utility's decisions regarding their choice of fuels.4 5 Indeed, in
recognition of this unique position, the Powder River Basin's very low sulfur coal
is often referred to as "compliance" coal. On the other hand, the 1982
Competition Report also identified a competitive disadvantage of Powder River
coal, its relatively low heat content meant that relatively large boilers must be
46
used in order to attain a given level of power output.
2.

The Southwest Market

The 1982 Competition Report also identified a Southwest market
composed of a number of regions producing relatively high BTU/low sulfur coal
in New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and Southern Colorado. 47 These coals were
transported over a wide area and thus were found to compete to some extent with
other western, midwestern and eastern coals. The 1982 Competition Report
concluded, however, that:

42 Id. at 36.
43 Id.
44 Id.

41 Id. at 16-18; 1979 COMPETION REPORT, supra note 32, at 9-12.
46 1982 COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 36, at 36. Boilers designed for higher BTU coal
generally suffer a "derate" in power output if Powder River coal is used, and boilers designed to
use the relatively cheap Powder River coal generally find it uneconomic to switch to more
expensive, higher BTU coal.
41

Id. at 37.
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[fior most customers, Powder River coal has a lower delivered
price and is therefore much more attractive [than Southwest
coal]. The higher heat content of [Southwestern coal], however,
can make it more economical for some customers, particularly
those far away from both regions, because it is cheaper to
transport on a BTU basis.4"
The wide shipment and competitive area of the Southwestern coal led the DOJ
to conclude that none of the individual areas within the Southwest constituted a
separate geographic market.

3.

The Northern Plains

Finally, the 1982 Competition Report identified the Northern Plains as a
separate geographic market.49 The Northern Plains market includes Northeast
Montana, North Dakota and South Dakotai 0 Northern Plains coal is primarily
lignite, a low BTU "brown" coal.5 1 According to the DOJ, Northern Plains coal
"is mined exclusively in low-cost surface mines" and "[t]ransportation of lignite
is costly and difficult."52 As a result, "the great bulk of the coal produced in the
Northern Plains Region is consumed locally in minemouth plants. 5 3 Therefore,
Northern Plains coals were not determined to be sufficiently competitive with
coals produced in other regions to warrant their inclusion in a broader geographic
market.
Identification of Market Participants

B.

Having defined the relevant product and geographic markets, the DOJ, in
later reports, set out to identify the participants in those markets, and, in
particular, to determine whether new entry was sufficiently likely to warrant

48 Id.

49

Id.at 35.

'0 Id. at 36.
51 1982 COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 36, at 36.
52 Id.
53

Id.
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consideration of those not currently active in the identified markets when
computing market concentration figures. The 1983 Competition Report concluded
that new entry into the coal markets that the DOJ had delineated was unlikely
because most such entries would have to occur through the leasing of federal coal
reserves. 4 The DOJ concluded that unleased federal reserves were unavailable
for two reasons. First, the Competition Report noted that, "[a]t the time the
Department adopted this treatment, there had been no significant federal coal
'
leasing for some time."55
Second, the Competition Report acknowledged
that, "[a] major reason for the Department's continued treatment of unleased
federal reserves as unavailable is the time-consuming process that is required to
lease coal under present law", "tak[ing] at least two and a half years to lease a
coal tract."56
C.

Calculation of Market Concentration

Having defined the relevant product and geographic markets, the DOJ
next turned in its 1983 Competition Report to the issue of market shares and
concentration. 7 According to the DOJ, the most meaningful measure for
computing market shares for purposes of assessing the relative competitive
importance of coal firm's was each firm's share of "uncommitted" coal reserves. 8
That is, coal reserves that are available and economically minable but not already
committed for sale under contracts for future delivery. Two principal methods
of measuring output as a basis for computing market shares are recognized in the
economic literature: annual sales and capacity. 9 Sales are generally viewed as
a superior basis for measuring output when products are differentiated, e.g., when
brands or advertising play a major role in consumer choice; however, capacity is
considered a better measure of output when products are homogeneous." The

54 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, Apr. 1983, at 10 [hereinafter 1983
COMPETITION REPORT].

53 Id.
56 Id.

57 Id.
5' Id. at 7.
59 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, at 41,557 (section 1.41).
60

id.
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DOJ concluded that the proper output measure in the coal industry was a capacity
measure because coal is a relatively homogeneous product typically purchased by
large informed customers.6 1 The DOJ chose uncommitted reserves as the best
capacity measure because it concluded that available reserves not committed by
prior contract best represented a coal mine's ability to compete for new coal
contracts." The DOJ attempted to measure the amount of uncommitted reserves
in the West utilizing certain criteria for inclusion as a reserve and information on
contractual commitments as of 1983. As of that time, the DOJ concluded that
concentration was not unduly high in the West. 63 The authors are not aware of
any update of this reserve measurement exercise.6
Competitive Effects Analysis

D.

Ultimately, the DOJ Competition Reports concluded that the identified
coal markets were "workably competitive. ,,61 In the DOJ's words,
While concentration in the Northern Plains is higher, and that in
the Southwest is quite high, evaluation of other structural factors
and the nature of the competitive process in those markets leads
to a conclusion that those markets, too, are workably competitive.
The factors leading to this conclusion include heterogeneity of
the product, countervailing buyer power, diversity of sellers, ease
of entry, and the predominant use of long-term, complex supply
contracts. Together, these factors suggest the existence of a
strong rivalry among sellers to win long-term supply contracts
with buyers whose size gives them significant bargaining
leverage. In this environment, a course of interdependent
anticompetitive behavior would be more difficult to sustain than

61

Id.

62

1983 COMPETITION

63

Id. at 5.

REPORT,

supra note 54, at 8.

Operationally, using uncommitted coal reserves as a basis for calculating market shares is
difficult. It requires data concerning not only each firm's reserves but also their existing coal
contracts to determine how much of their existing reserves are committed. Most private parties will
not have such information and will need to compute market shares by annual sales or production,
or by annual capacity or total reserves.
64

65

1978 COMPETITION

REPORT,

supra note 30, at 130.
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in markets characterized by spot transactions, relatively weak
buyers and simple products.66
The DOJ did not consider the possibility of a unilateral exercise of market
power, a category of analysis introduced by the Merger Guidelines. Instead, it
specifically considered only the likelihood of collusion, stating that "the
possibility of single firm exercises of market power is remote."67 Under the
Merger Guidelines, analysis of the possibility of unilateral market power may be
required.68
III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF WESTERN COAL MERGERS:
ACCOUNTING FOR NEW REALITIES

Several significant changes in the coal industry itself, and in electrical
power generation and transmission, since the Competition Reports were last
published in 1983 draw into question several of the fundamental premises used
in the DOJ's earlier conclusions. Accordingly, significant modifications in the
approach undertaken by the Agencies in analyzing coal mergers, or at least the
starting points for that analysis, may be warranted. These industry changes
portend dramatic consequences on the proper definition of the relevant product
and geographic markets, suggesting that the DOJ may need to expand previously
defined product markets to include non-coal energy sources and drawing into
serious question the geographic markets identified in the Competition Reports.
A.

Definition of Relevant Markets
1.

Product Market

Perhaps the most important change that has occurred in the coal industry
since the DOJ Competition Reports involves the analysis of the product market
in coal mergers. Because of dramatic deregulation of natural gas pipelines,
falling gas prices and improved technology in natural gas turbines, natural gas is

66

Id. at 130.

67

1983 COMPETITION REPORT at 5.

6'Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, at 41,560 (section 2.2). Unilateral market power becomes an
issue under the Merger Guidelines when the combined market share of the merged firms exceeds
35%. Id. at 41,560 (section 2.211). The possibility of unilateral market power also assumes
oligopoly rivalry between coal producers.
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now a genuine substitute for coal for power generation.69 The likelihood and
extent of this substitution obviously depends on the relative prices of coal and
natural gas. By one estimate, in order for coal to be preferred to natural gas it
must have an approximately $1.65 per million BTU price advantage over natural
gas. At present, however, coal's price advantage is only approximately ninety
cents per million BTU. 0
Moreover, most new electric generating capacity has been the result of
non-utility growth. 71 Since natural gas fuels most non-utility electric generation
and the growth trend among non-utility generators will likely continue into the
future, the importance of natural gas as a source for electrical power generation
is likely to increase.72 Consequently, the proper coal product market may now
include other competing forms of energy, and, particularly, natural gas. A

69See, e.g., Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at Al. According to the Wall Street
Journal:
Jet-Engine Technology lifts output of natural-gas turbines. General Electric's
latest mode pushes electricity-generation costs down to about 3.2 cents per
kilowatt hour. Gas is abundant and cheap. So, gas turbines become a
marketplace weapon: Lower our rates, large manufacturers say to utilities, or
we will buy our own power plant.
Id.; see also Fuel Switching Between Coal and Gas, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 15, 1995; The Choice
of Fuel in Competitive Generation, EPRI FUEL INSIGHTS, May 1995. This is significant because
the vast majority of U.S. coal (75.9 %) is used in electric generation. Only 4.6% of U.S. coal is
used in steel, 7.7% is consumed in other industrial uses, and the balance is exported. Western coal
consumed by electric utilities is an even higher proportion, approximately 90%. See Sievers, supra
note 19, at 29.
70 See Robert Smock, Utilities View Changes in Coal PurchasingPatterns,ELECTRIC LIGHT &
POWER, May 1995, at 33.
71Independent power capacity added in 1990 for the first time exceeded the amount of capacity
added by electric utilities. See Edison Elec. Inst. (1990), Capacity and Generation of Non-Utility
Source of Energy (1992); see also Michael Baly III, The Natural Gas Industry in 1995: The Only
Constant Was Change, GAS ENERGY REV., Jan. 1996, at 2 ("[G]as-fired cogeneration is likely to
increase rapidly when construction of electric generating capacity resumes .... A.G.A. expects this
trend to continue, as new technologies such as reduced NOX boilers ... supplement traditional
boiler and process uses.").
72 Non-utility generation includes two categories of facilities, Qualified Facilities ("QF's") and

Exempt Wholesale Generators ("EWG's"). QF's consist of co-generation and small power
producers ("QF's") that receive special regulatory treatment under the Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). Typically, QF's sell power either directly to utilities, or compete
directly with utilities, for power sales to large industrial customers. The Energy Policy Act of 1992
defines exempt wholesale generators as producers exclusively in the business of power generation
for wholesale that make an appropriate filing with FERC.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1997

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:433

combined product market consisting of coal and natural gas would be profoundly
unconcentrated, eliminating virtually any concerns raised by consolidation among
coal producers.
2.

Geographic Market

There is little doubt that the DOJ's earlier defined geographic markets
cannot stand in light of subsequent developments. Certainly, if the product
market was expanded to include other fuels, the geographic market would have
to be broadened accordingly. But, even assuming a product market consisting
only of coal, the DOJ's geographic markets should be broadened for several
reasons.
First, the trend toward higher transportation costs, earlier relied on by the
DOJ to define narrower geographic markets, has been reversed. Transportation
costs for most coal producers have fallen significantly since 1983, primarily as
a result of new railroad investment in the area and new rail competition serving
the key, coal-producing regions." The barge industry has also significantly
increased shipping efficiency.74 As a result, current shipping patterns of western
coal have lengthened. The significance of these changes should not be underestimated. One early economic study of coal markets concluded that lower
transportation costs could make the western United States a single coal market.75
Second, contrary to the situation in 1982, utility boilers are no longer as
wedded to a specific BTU coal content. New technologies are making high and
low BTU coal head to head competitors. Recent studies have acknowledged a
"[s]urprising ability to use subbituminous coals cost-effectively in boilers designed

3 For example, the Chicago & Northwestern railroad, Union Pacific's partner in the region, has
invested $1.7 billion in capital improvements such as new tracks and locomotives. See Smock,
supra note 70, at 33; Gus Welty, Coal Comes on Strong. Can We Cope?, RAILWAY AGE, Feb.
1995, at 25. Coal is typically transported by unit train. A unit train is usually comprised of
approximately 100 cars, each car carrying approximately 100 tons of coal, and three to five
locomotives. Unit train rates are substantially lower than those of other types of service because
of economies resulting from the dedication of an entire train to the needs of a single or small
number of utilities.
74See Henry Stein, Coal Supply and TransportationChanges As They Climb, ELECTRIC LIGHT &
PoWER, June 1994, at 27.
75 See Thomas C. Campell & Ming-Jeng Hwang, Market Area Analysis of Three Major Coal
Markets in the U.S., 6 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 66, 71 (1978) (stating that the entire west is considered
one market).
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'
And other industry sources have noted that the
for bituminous coals."76
substitutability between different types of coal has been much more than
previously anticipated."
Third, the costs of complying with the Clean Air Act have been less than
anticipated. Stockpiling of allowances has allowed utilities to defer for years the
more stringent requirements of the law scheduled to begin in 2000, permitting
utilities to use alternatives to low sulfur Powder River Basin coal in the interim.78
Finally, utility deregulation has increased the ability of utilities to
substitute away from high priced coal by buying bulk power from other
generation plants. Many utilities have entered into regional power agreements,
effectively permitting them to buy "coal by wire" from other suppliers or
regions. 9 As deregulation increases, accessibility to the high voltage transmission
system, coal-by-wire will likely grow in popularity. For example, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has approved the governing
agreements for the Western Regional Transmission Association, an association of
retail producers that pool power resources. Such groups increase the options to
utilities faced with a price increase by coal procedures. Rather than purchase coal
at high prices, members of the retail power pool can purchase power from utilities
using coal from other geographic markets. 0
State public utility commissions ("PUCs") that regulate the retail sale of
electricity energy have also joined the deregulation bandwagon. Traditionally,
most public utilities have consisted of vertically integrated supply systems owning

76

Jeremy Platt, Compliance and Allowances: Why Are PricesSo Low?, MIT ENERGY POL'Y.

WORKSHOP, Oct. 5-6, 1995.
77 Cate

Jones, Re-engineering Powerplantsto Compete in the Era of Deregulation, POWER, Aug.

1995, at 13; Dallas Burtraw, Regulatory Issues in Title IV Compliance, MIT ENERGY POL'Y
WORKSHOP, Oct. 5-6, 1995; JAMES N. HELLER, FIELDSTON CO., INC., Lessons of Deregulation:

StrategicAssessment of Regional Coal Supply and TransportationMarkets.
78

Jeff Bailey, Utilities Over Comply with Clean Air Act, Are Stockpiling Pollution Allowances,

WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995, at A6.

' Coal-by-wire involves building a power plant near a mine rather than where the power is used.
The power, rather than the coal, is transmitted long distance over high voltage lines. See RESOURCE
DATA INT'L, COMPETITIVE POWER MARKETS AND DEREGULATION; BRADLEY C. LEWIS, JOHN T.
BOYT Co., DEREGULATION-THE DOUBLE EDGED KILOWATT SWORD (Oct. 1995).
" To the extent that customers of utilities are military bases, the 1996 Department of Defense
spending bill includes a provision to allow Department of Defense installations to solicit bids for
the lowest cost source of electricity regardless of the utility with the retail franchise for the
installations location.
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generator plants, transmission lines and distribution systems with a monopoly
franchise to wheel retail power. Under pressure from large industrial customers,
many PUCs have adopted initiatives that allow customers to circumvent the
utility's monopoly franchise at the local level. As a result, utilities that use one
source of coal will be forced to compete at the retail level with utilities using
other sources of coal, thereby placing downward pressure on the price of coal.
Notwithstanding these dramatic changes, there may still be circumstances
where narrower geographic markets, even markets limited to a single, isolated
customer, may be appropriate. In cases where the merged firms have particular
advantages in serving particular customers (e.g., local transportation cost
advantages, particular coal qualities, etc.), and, where prices could be selectively
increased to those customers, the Agencies will still likely be concerned about
potential exercises of market power in such smaller, "price discrimination"
markets. As a result, parties proposing coal mergers may still need to undertake
a customer by customer analysis to determine whether the proposed merger
substantially disadvantages any particular customer (such as by going from two
to one alternative sources of supply).8 Even when such price discrimination
markets are possible, however, the merging parties may assuage any agency
concerns of isolated anti-competitive effects by acting proactively to address the
potential problem before it occurs. For example, the merging parties could
mitigate any concerns about such vulnerable customers before the merger by
granting them a long-term contract at a favorable price. In addition, the
Agencies' concern may be mitigated by the fact that most coal purchases are
made on an F.O.B. mine basis, with the customer arranging for transportation.
As a result, prices can be stated in common terms, and customers can determine
whether they are being quoted discriminatory prices.
B.

Identification of Market Participants

Subsequent developments also draw into question the Competition
Reports' conclusion that only current market participants should be included in
the market analysis because entry into the western coal markets is unlikely
because of regulatory difficulties in acquiring new sources for coal. The process
of obtaining a federal coal lease has been substantially streamlined and
"decertified," such that individuals can now obtain federal leases more quickly
and easily. As a result, unlike the period prior to 1983, significant federal leases
have been granted through the lease by application process. Therefore, a
persuasive argument can be made that private parties could respond to any
"' Being tied to a particular coal deposit also generally results in being tied to a particular railroad
as well.
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increase in coal prices by leasing federal coal reserves, and/or that the government
could rectify any perceived competitive problem resulting from a merger through
the strategic granting of coal leases.82
C.

Calculationof Market Concentration

Although the Competition Reports endorse measuring market
concentration using shares of uncommitted non-federal reserves, this is a difficult
task for private parties proposing a merger. Competitors generally do not have
access to data regarding reserves or current coal contracts. However, alternative
measures are generally available that also accurately reflect competitive realities
and are more easily computed. Other candidate measures include other categories
of reserves (e.g., in-place, demonstrated, recoverable), alternative measures of
capacity (e.g., proven, air permit, equipment), and historical production.8 3 When
applied, these measures uniformly find a lack of concentration for any markets
broader than those proposed by the DOJ, indicating that little competitive danger
is likely to accompany additional consolidation in the coal industry.
D.

Competitive Effects Analysis

Finally, in addition to the structural factors that the DOJ pointed to in
concluding that coal markets are "workably competitive," a persuasive case can
be made that market power is not likely to be exercised in the coal industry, even
if the relevant markets were concentrated, because of the method by which most
coal supply contracts are awarded. The recent "bidding model" economic
analysis that has already found significant acceptance at the Agencies supports
this conclusion.
These bidding models have been derived from the extensive economic

The government's significant control over entry into coal markets distinguishes coal from most
industries that the Agencies scrutinize. The federal government owns an estimated 72% of all
western coal reserves and, because of scattered ownership, controls another 14% of such reserves.
See NATIONAL MINING Ass'N, FACTs ABOUT COAL 14 (1995).
' Reserves can be measured either in terms of the amount of coal in the ground (in-place reserves),
or the amount of coal that likely could be extracted and shipped to buyers if mined using
conventional techniques (recoverable reserves). Demonstrated reserves include only coal classified
as measured or indicated reserves. The latter terms refer to reliability criteria based on the distance
the coal is situated from an observation point; i.e., coal seam, outcrop or drill hole.
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literature on auctions." In an auction or "bidding market," the buyer solicits bids
for the sale of a product specifying the necessary qualities and terms required (for
example, ash content, sulfur content, time of delivery, etc.), and the sellers
respond with confidential offers. The buyer then selects the lowest priced offer
that satisfies the specifications.
While there are various methods of structuring auctions, the sale of coal
in the western United States typically occurs through simple sealed bid auctions
involving a single round of offers. Economists have theorized that, in such
bidding markets, concentration may not reflect the true competitive reality. For
example, according to one popular bidding market model, it is assumed that, in
markets characterized by competitive bidding, the winning bidder will be the
company with the lowest cost of serving the customer, and the winning bid will
reflect the costs of the next lowest cost bidder (reflecting the bid that must be
beat)., 5 Accordingly, under this analysis, the critical issue is not the extent of
concentration in the market, but rather whether the proposed merger would
combine the two lowest cost providers (with respect to a particular customer),
causing the price to rise to the costs of the third lowest cost supplier. If it can
be demonstrated that the two coal companies that are merging are unlikely to be
the lowest cost bidders, or that the costs of the next highest cost bidder is
insignificantly greater, then it can be argued that no market power can be
exercised irrespective of the level of concentration." Thus, it may be possible
under certain circumstances to show that a coal merger will not be anticompetitive
even if it is judged by the Agencies to significantly raise concentration in the
relevant product and geographic market.

84 See

e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.

LITERATURE

699 (1987); John G. Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 381
(1981); Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982); LUKE FROEB, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP
DisCUSSION PAPER, AUCTIONS AND ANTITRUST, Aug. 22, 1988.
85 Id.
' A further bidding model variant investigates whether the number of potential bidders, "m" is
greater than the number of actual bidders "n." Letter from Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to John H. Preston, Economists
Incorporated (Jan. 14, 1986) (on file with author). In this case, there may be no competitive
concern, even when the transaction combines two of a small number of bidders, as long as actual
bidders can be replaced at comparable costs, by potential bidders.
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453

IV. CONCLUSION

Dramatic changes in the coal industry itself, the transportation industries
that service it, and the electrical generation industry which it supplies, draw into
serious question certain fundamental premises on which the antitrust enforcement
agencies have based their review of proposed coal mergers. Recognition of these
changes, and the new reality that has resulted, suggests that future mergers in the
coal industry are unlikely to raise significant anti-competitive concerns, and that
a more relaxed scrutiny of such mergers is warranted.
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